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I. INTRODUCTION
"You already have zero privacy-get over it," warned Scott
McNealy, chief executive of Sun Microsystems at the launch of his
company's Jini consumer networking software.' In fact, laws
protecting privacy are everywhere in the United States. These
privacy laws intersect with the Internet in more ways than even Mr.
McNealy might imagine. The problem is that thinking about how
United States privacy law interacts with the Internet can be
perplexing. Just as the British poet, Stephen Spender wondered at
"understanding the intersection of visible with invisible worlds,"
observers of privacy and the Internet can be bewildered by the
complexity of the intersecting elements. Of course, unlike Spender's
image, aspects of invisibility and visibility, concreteness and
abstraction, are woven into both the Internet and privacy laws.
The purpose of this essay is to consider some characteristics of
t Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. Wellesley College; J.D.
Harvard Law School. This essay is based on remarks prepared for the symposium, Privacy in
the Next Millennium, February 11-12,2000 at Santa Clara University.
1. John Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y.
TimES, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al.
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United States privacy law that contribute to the obscurity of many
intersections between the Internet and privacy law. This discussion is
not an exhaustive catalogue of all of the ways in which United States
privacy law may apply to Internet activities. Nor is it intended to be
an evaluation of the effectiveness of this privacy law. Rather, the
point here is to explore why the application of privacy law to the
Internet is a matter of considerable complexity and some uncertainty.
The focus is on certain characteristics of privacy law that can mislead
even very smart people into believing that privacy is not here.
Both the Internet and United States privacy law operate in varied
ways across many dimensions. Just as the Internet is an
interconnection of digital networks that operates in multiple ways to
communicate data and other information worldwide, United States
privacy law embraces many types of laws that protect and vindicate
individual self-determination with regard to personal activities,
private decisions, and personal information about an individual.2
With regard to the Internet, a varied assortment of privacy laws
function in different ways to protect and to vindicate individual
control over personal activities, decisions, and information. The
complexities of the potential interactions between privacy law and the
Internet may be difficult to visualize. But it is a mistake to count
privacy, and the laws which protect it, as zero.
II. THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITED STATES PRIVACY LAW
Three main characteristics of United States privacy law help to
explain why it can be difficult to understand how privacy law
intersects with the Internet. First, United States privacy law is
diverse. Second, United States privacy law is decentralized. Third,
United States privacy law is dynamic. As privacy law has evolved
over the past century or so, these characteristics have resulted in a
myriad of specific privacy laws applicable in the United States. Only
a few of the details of these privacy laws can be noted here.
Consider an average Internet user, Irene.' During a typical week,
2. Warren & Brandeis first described the right to privacy as a right to an "inviolate
personality." See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193,205 (1890). The article argued that: "The common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others ... fix[ing] the limits of the publicity which shall be given to them."
Id. at 198.
3. See results of a recent study by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of
Society. Norman H Nie & Lutz Erbing, Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report (visited
Feb. 18, 2000) <http:llwww.stanford.edu/group/siqss>. The survey was based on a nationwide
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Irene is on-line for five hours or so, reading and sending e-mail to
friends and business associates, doing research and writing reports.
Sometimes Irene participates in Internet auctions or purchases books
or airline tickets from Internet companies. She subscribes to a couple
of Usenet groups and occasionally visits chat rooms and on-line
forums. Irene probably believes that her Internet activities are
private. But she is most likely unaware of the multitude of privacy
laws applicable to her activities on the Internet. Although these
privacy laws may not perfectly protect Irene's on-line privacy,4 if
Irene were aware of the many ways in which privacy laws affect her
on-line, she would be amazed.'
A. Diverse
Understanding United States privacy law begins with the
recognition that privacy law is not an "it." Instead, United States
privacy law is a very diverse collection of many different types of
privacy laws. The tendency of these privacy laws to focus on
specific, even narrow, privacy concerns or contexts has generated
widespread criticism of privacy laws in the United States as
"piecemeal" or fragmented. A number of years ago a federal appeals
court judge described United States privacy law as like a "haystack in
a hurricane."7 In an opinion for the United States Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized privacy as "defying categorical
description. ' Even the distinguished privacy advocate, Arthur R.
random sample of 4,113 individuals over the age of 18 in 2,689 households. Over a third (36%)
of those responding reported being on-line at least five hours each week. Almost half of the
respondents reported Internet use of between one and five hours per week. See John Markoff, A
Newer, Lonelier Crowd Emerges in Internet Study, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2000, at Al fig.
4. Indeed, aspects of privacy law may well be antiquated, out of sync with modem life,
not to mention Internet technologies. Since most privacy law was not designed with the Internet
in mind, loopholes and misfits are to be expected. However, privacy law's many imperfections
are not the focus of this discussion. Rather the point here is to demonstrate that, although a
great deal of privacy law does apply to Irene's on-line activities, understanding that privacy law
can be difficult.
5. Professor Lawrence Lessig has ably addressed different, but no less intriguing, issues
regarding the architecture of the Internet and whether the Internet is being designed and built
with acceptable respect for privacy values in mind. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Chapter 11 discusses the value of privacy and the
importance of building it into the architecture of the Internet. See id. at 142-63.
6. Almost every imaginable imagery of a heterogeneous mixture has been used to
describe United States privacy law. Many of these metaphors seem to be based on food-from
hodgepodge (stew) to succotash (mixed vegetables).
7. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
8. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,713 (1976).
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Miller, described United States privacy law as "a thing of threads and
patches." 9 And yet the very diversity that makes privacy law seem
difficult to pin down also contributes to its vitality and makes its
application to the Internet interesting.
Three aspects of the diversity of United States privacy laws are
particularly important: (i) the tendency of modem privacy law to
divide into at least two main branches of privacy interests: privacy
concerns about autonomy and privacy concerns about personal
information; (ii) the variety of different types of privacy laws; and
(iii) the specific, context-dependent nature of many privacy laws.
These characteristics of privacy law account for much of the internal
diversity and complexity of United States privacy law.
1. Autonomy and Personal Information
As United States privacy law evolved over the past century, two
general branches developed. These two branches reflect what are
perceived to be different types of privacy concerns: On the one hand,
privacy law is concerned about an individual's autonomous control
over personal activities and decisions. On the other hand, privacy law
is also concerned about an individual's control over personal
information about that individual.' For example, the California
Supreme Court has described the guarantee of an "inalienable right to
privacy" in the California constitution as divided into two separate
areas of privacy interests: "(1) interests in precluding the
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information
('informational privacy'); and (2) interests in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without
observation, intrusion or interference ('autonomy privacy')."'
Depending on the category into which a particular privacy case fits, a
different privacy analysis applies.
Although often treated as separate categories, autonomy privacy
and informational privacy are in fact intimately intertwined,
particularly when privacy law intersects with the Internet. For
example, assume that our average Internet user, Irene, objects to
9. ARTHURR. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971).
10. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,598-99 (1977), Justice Stevens noted that: "The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds
of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
11. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35, 865 P.2d 633, 654, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 834, 856 (1994); see also discussion in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16
Cal. 4th 307, 332,940 P.2d 797, 812, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210,225 (1997) (plurality opinion).
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surreptitious electronic surveillance of her Internet activities through
the collection of personal information about her on-line activities.
Such an objection is partly classified as a concern about autonomy
privacy-her ability to control her life and her choices about how to
live that life. This privacy concern is about her "right to be let alone,"
frequently associated with the autonomy right to privacy. At the
same time, Irene is also concerned about whether personal
information about her is stored, manipulated, connected up with other
information or disseminated to others. For example, Irene may well
be concerned about a marketing company's collecting information
about the web sites she visits, about the company's manipulating this
information into an "Irene" on-line profile, about the company's
connecting that profile with other information (such as her address
and telephone number), and also about the company's selling the
whole consumer picture of Irene to a marketing firm. These
informational privacy concerns are, of course, interrelated with her
autonomy privacy concerns. Internet users, such as Irene, object to
collection of information about their on-line activities both because
such surveillance interferes with their individual autonomy and
because they have an informational privacy interest in controlling the
use of such information. Nevertheless, United States privacy law
often places these concerns in separate categories and applies
different analysis to each of them.
Because the Internet is an information network, most Internet
observers look at Internet activities as involving primarily
informational privacy concerns about controlling the collection,
storage, manipulation, and dissemination of personal information.
For example, Irene is concerned about unauthorized disclosure of her
credit card numbers or her bank account balance. But such concerns
are only part of the picture. In fact, for Irene and other Internet users,
autonomy privacy interests in preventing the collection of such
information in the first place may well be of even greater practical
importance. After all, personal information that is not collected
cannot be stored, manipulated or disclosed.
Autonomy privacy interests are often associated with such issues
as decisions regarding contraception'3 and abortion.14 But autonomy
12. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. The notion of a "right to be let alone" is
usually attributed to Judge Thomas Cooley, who described it as "[tlhe right to one's person may
be said to be a right of complete immunity: the right to be let alone." THOMAS M. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON ToRmS 29 (1879).
13. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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privacy also extends to an individual's self-determination regarding
who will have how much access to that individual." In the Internet
context, Irene's autonomy privacy concerns include her ability to
control whether or not her purchases of various types of goods and
services from Internet sites are compiled into her consumer profile,
since that profile is likely to be a "stand-in" or alter-ego for her with
regard to future transactions. Autonomy privacy concerns also arise
when censors or snoopers interfere with Irene's choices to send and to
receive information over the Internet. 6 Surreptitious surveillance of
Irene's Internet activities, for example through "cookies" or by
creation of an on-line profile of her browsing habits, also raise
autonomy concerns about her privacy on the Internet. Another
example of autonomy privacy is Irene's choice to visit web sites
anonymously. She might, for example, decide to participate in a
Usenet group for expectant mothers under a pseudonym without
revealing her actual identity. Irene might also choose to interact with
the Internet through a persona or avatar. Her screen name might be
"Inez" or "Ike" in a chat room, for example. Such autonomous self-
redefinition illustrates a slightly different, and controversial, form of
autonomy privacy, sometimes called anonymity 7or pseudonymity.
Although privacy tort actions have for a long time protected an
individual's autonomy privacy right to self-definition and
redefinition," the extent to which such autonomy privacy concerns
15. The initial argument for recognizing a right of privacy in the United States defined
privacy as based on the principle of "an inviolate personality" associated with "the right to be let
alone." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205; see also Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 21-28 (1979).
16, See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In this case involving the seizure of
obscene film from a person's home, Justice Marshall insisted that the
Right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society .... [T]he right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy .... If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or films he
may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds.
Id. at 564-65.
17. See generally Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE LJ. 1639 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). This damage action
for invasion of privacy was brought in the 1930s by a reformed prostitute against film makers
who made a movie, "The Red Kimono," in which they used both the facts of her former life as a
prostitute and her maiden name. The court found that, having reformed and redefined herself as
a respectable married woman, she had a recognizable cause of action based on "the right to live
one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesirable publicity. In
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can or should be translated into privacy law applicable to the Internet
remains controversial.19
2. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Legal protections for both autonomy privacy interests and
informational privacy interests often depend in part on whether
expectations of privacy are considered reasonable in a particular
setting.2 For example, legal protection for Irene's privacy is likely to
depend in part on whether she reasonably expects privacy when she
accesses the Internet. Since Internet users, such as Irene, would be
reluctant to log onto the Internet if they could not reasonably expect at
least some degree of privacy with regard to their on-line activities,
they appear to have at least some reasonable expectation of privacy
on the Internet. Assurances of privacy protection by e-commerce
vendors l and Internet service providers? demonstrate that the
short, it is the right to be let alone." Id. at 289, 297 P. at 92 (1931).
19. Objections to Internet-anonymity are typically based on concerns about the potential
for untraceable criminal activity such as money laundering, misappropriation of intellectual
property, or drug trafficking. See United States Department of Justice, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET,
(Mar. 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm> (Report of the
President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet).
20. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was a wiretapping case
involving Fourth Amendment objections to interception of Katz's telephone calls from a public
telephone booth. The majority opinion is famous for its ruling that the privacy protections in the
Fourteenth Amendment protect "people and not simply 'areas."' Id. at 353. Justice Harlan
stated in his concurring opinion that whether there was a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes depended on two factors, "first, whether the person involved exhibited an actual,
subjective, expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. For example, American Express begins its Internet Privacy Statement with the
assertion: "Protecting your privacy is important to us." American Express Customer Internet
Privacy Statement (visited Apr. 2, 2000)
<http:/home3.americanexpress.com/corp/Consumerinfo/privacy/privacystatementasp>. The
"Lycos Privacy Policy" page features not only a statement about Lycos's subscription to the
TRUSTe privacy protection program but also "Our Privacy Vow." See Lycos Privacy Page
(visited Apr. 2, 2000) <http:llwww.lycos.comlprivacy/>. Unfortunately the content of this
"privacy vow" seems to have more to do with collecting information than with respecting
privacy. The vow states:
Our goal at Lycos is to be 'Your Personal Internet Guide' by providing you with
the information and services that are most relevant to you. To achieve this goal,
we need to collect information to understand what differentiates you from each of
our millions of other unique users. We collect this information in two ways.
Id.
The bottom line of the Lycos Privacy Policy, its last element, is entitled "Delete/Delist," and
states, "[iut is not currently possible for a Lycos customer to delete his or her information from
the database." Id. A personal request to be removed from the database will, however, be
honored, according to the Lycos Privacy Policy. See id.
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commercial side of the Internet recognizes that respect for privacy is a
significant expectation of Internet users.
Although the Internet may appear to some as a wide open and
not very private environment, not every bit of digital data on the
Internet is open to anyone who knows how to access it.2' For
example, encryption, fire walls and other data security techniques can
make certain Internet information inaccessible as a practical matter.
Moreover, simply declaring the Internet non-private does not
necessarily make it so; 24 nor does such a declaration eliminate
reasonable privacy expectations on the part of Internet users. In
reality, Internet users, such as Irene, reasonably expect some degree
of privacy on the Internet, both because they are repeatedly assured
that their privacy is being respected, and because privacy laws of
many types protect and vindicate privacy rights with regard to both
their autonomy and their control over personal information.
3. Types of Privacy Laws
Many types of privacy laws, both civil and criminal, protect and
vindicate privacy interests in the United States. Although mostly
developed before the Internet, these various types of privacy laws can
apply to on-line activities of Internet users. A detailed description of
all of these types of privacy laws is beyond the scope of this essay.
But it is useful to highlight some of the major types including
constitutional law, common law, statutory law, regulatory law, as well
as self-regulatory measures.
22. For example, see AOL's "Privacy Policy," which states "America Online, Inc. is
strongly committed to protecting the privacy of consumers of its interactive products and
services." AOLconi, Privacy Policy (visited Apr. 2, 2000)
<http:\\www.aol.com/info/privacy.html>.
23. Lawrence Lessig has argued that the Internet can and should be even better organized
and constructed to respect privacy. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 142-63 (discussing the issue of
privacy in Chapter II).
24. The United States Supreme Court frowned on what the Court called "conditioning"
expectations of privacy in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,740 (1979) (finding no search when
the government used a pen register to record numbers dialed from a telephone). In a footnote,
the Court noted that the government cannot eliminate legitimate expectations of privacy by
suddenly
[Alnnoune[ing] on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be
subject to warrantless entry [so that] individuals thereafter might not in fact
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects .... In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations
had be 'conditioned' by [extraneous] influences ... a normative inquiry would be
proper.
Id. at 740 n.5.
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As an example, consider the privacy laws applicable to
electronic surveillance of Irene's Internet activities of the complex
layers of different types of privacy laws. Irene is logged on to the
Internet at home through a modem. Assume that Gill, a law
enforcement officer, intercepts Irene's Internet communications,
without a warrant or intercept order, and records Irene's e-mail
messages and Internet transactions without her knowledge or consent.
Gill's invasion of Irene's privacy is illegal under federal statutes
prohibiting wiretapping without a warrant, as well as under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and other civil and
criminal laws regulating electronic surveillance by government
agencies and agents."' Assume further that Paul, a private
investigator, similarly taps and records Irene's on-line
communications and transactions. Paul's invasion of Irene's Internet
privacy would subject Paul to both civil and criminal penalties under
different provisions of federal electronic surveillance statutes, as well
as under privacy laws of most states.6 As will be discussed further
with regard to the decentralized nature of privacy law, a combination
of both federal and state privacy laws, including both civil and
criminal statutes and state common law, would make electronic
surveillance of Irene's Internet communications illegal on many
levels.
Of the various types of privacy laws, those relating to
constitutional privacy rights are probably the most controversial.2
According to Justice William 0. Douglas's expansive view of
constitutional rights to privacy, the penumbras of several provisions
25. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994);
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1994); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F.
Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). Gill may also be in violation of state constitutional provisions and
statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1999).
26. Federal statutes include the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (1994) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994). An
example of a state criminal statue penalizing wiretapping is CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (vest
1999). The common law tort of intrusion, discussed infra at notes 36,47-55, may also provide a
basis for damage liability.
27. The reasons for the controversial status of federal constitutional privacy rights are
many. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas's Right of Privacy: A Response to His Critics, in "HE
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN:" THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS 155
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990). In the first place, the United States Constitution does not contain
the word "privacy." Moreover, there is a broad range of many types of implicit constitutional
privacy rights-from rights to receive information to rights to make decisions about procreation.
Some of these privacy rights involve matters of deep-seated social and religious disagreement.
For a critical discussion of Douglas' expansive view of the constitutional right of privacy see
William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 21 (1974).
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of Bill of Rights, including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies to the
states, all protect privacy." These federal constitutional privacy rights
are safeguarded against governmental action interfering with an
individual's privacy. Most of them focus on the autonomy branch of
privacy law. For example, Gill's warrantless electronic surveillance
of Irene's Internet activities would violate her Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches.29  In addition, government
interference with Irene's rights to unhindered communication with
others, and against surveillance of her reading habits would most
likely be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Regarding
government collection of personal information about Irene's Internet
activities and storing it in a database, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that, government mandated databases of personal
information where the information is not lawfully collected nor
adequately safeguarded, may violate federal constitutional privacy
guarantees. °
Most state constitutions contain search and seizure provisions
similar to those in the federal constitution.3 A few state constitutions
also contain provisions explicitly protecting privacy. For example,
the California Constitution expressly guarantees "an inalienable right
to privacy." 32  Moreover, California's state constitutional privacy
provision applies broadly to prohibit interference with privacy both
by governmental and by private-sector invaders.33
As a result, if Irene were on-line in California, her Internet
activities would be protected under California's constitution against
both misuse of personal information about her and interferences with
her autonomy. This state constitutional privacy protection would
apply to invasions of privacy both by government agents, such as
28. See, e.g., Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding
unconstitutional a Connecticut criminal statute which penalized the distribution of birth control
information or devices to married persons).
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). Justice Stevens' majority opinion
included "[a] final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
data banks or other massive government files." Id. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (concerning former president's constitutional privacy interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters).
31. See, e.g., CAL CONST. art. 1, § 13.
32. Id. § 1.
33. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1976).
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Gill, and by private investigators, such as Paul.
A second type of privacy law is part of the common law of torts.
The origins of common law protection for privacy in the United
States date back to a famous 1890 law review article, The Right to
Privacy, largely written by Louis Brandeis, later a United States
Supreme Court Justice.3 Almost all states now allow such damage
actions for invasion of privacy. In fact, the common law of most
states recognizes four different privacy torts. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts Sections 652A-652I, adopted by the American
Law Institute in 1977 provides a conventional description of the four
privacy torts: 35
Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion (commonly referred to
as "Intrusion")36
* Appropriation of another's name or likeness (commonly
referred to as "Appropriation") 37
* Unreasonable Publicity given to another's private life
(commonly referred to as "Private Facts") 38
* Publicity unreasonably placing another person in a false light
(commonly referred to as "False Light")39
These four privacy torts are "personal" in the sense that only the
living individual whose privacy has been invaded has the right to
bring a lawsuit based on them.40 Privacy tort actions are also
generally limited by absolute and conditional privileges similar to
those applicable in defamation actions, such as consent and First
Amendment protection for freedom of expression.' In most cases
involving these privacy torts, liability requires the privacy invasion to
have been unreasonable.
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. The article described invasion of privacy as
interference with an individual's "inviolate personality" and argued that the common law should
allow damage actions to redress and punish invasions of privacy. See id. at 198, 205. See
generally Glancy, supra note 15.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToTS §§ 652A-I (1977). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts [hereinafter "Restatement"] categories reflect an analysis of privacy cases by William
Prosser, who was the Reporter for that Restatement. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
37. Id. § 652C. Sometimes this privacy tort is described as vindicating a right to
publicity.
38. Id. § 652D.
39. Id. § 652E.
40. See id. § 6521. In some states, statutes provide for the survival of privacy tort causes
of action. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2000).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 652F-652G (1977).
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So far, only a few reported decisions have applied the
Restatement's categories of common law privacy torts to the Internet,
and only in regards to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.42 In the
context of computer networks, reported decisions include Wood v.
National Computer Systems, Inc.43 and Morrow v. II Morrow, Inc.4 In
both of these cases, summary judgment for defendants was held
appropriate because the allegedly privacy-invading material was not
sufficiently published to the public at large, but rather was disclosed
within a restricted network. Although distribution on a local area
network (LAN) might not satisfy the "publication" required for
liability under the privacy torts involving publicity, Internet
distribution of information does seem to provide sufficient publicity
for the appropriation, private facts and false light privacy torts. For
example, in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., the
Federal District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing an
adult entertainment Internet content provider from distributing over
the Internet a videotape of celebrity plaintiffs, Bret Michaels and
Pamela Anderson Lee, engaged in sexual activity.45
It is interesting to consider how each of the common law privacy
torts might apply to an Internet user such as Irene, who is accessing
the Internet from her home.4 For the purposes of the intrusion
privacy tort, whether or not Irene can be said to have seclusion on the
Internet depends in part on the extent to which the Internet can be
considered a private place. Generally, the Restatement's concept of
seclusion depends on whether a plaintiff's expectations of privacy are
reasonable in that particular setting. 47 Public opinion polls about
privacy concerns with regard to Internet activities seem to suggest
that at least some on-line activities, such as those involving healthcare
information or personal financial information communicated in e-
42. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, II F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F.
Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998).
43. 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (teacher's competency examination report
mistakenly sent to another teacher did not constitute public disclosure of private facts).
44. 139 Or. App. 212, 911 P.2d 964 (Or. App. 1996) (false-light invasion of privacy
action against employer who posted critical evaluation of employee on hard drive accessible
company-wide was not established because employer did not distribute personal information to
public generally).
45. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Although the preliminary injunction was based
on both invasion of privacy and copyright infringement, the court specifically found that the
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on privacy claims based on appropriation and publicity given to
private life. See id. at 840.
46. Different privacy law analysis would apply if Irene were on-line in her employer's
offices.
47. See discussion supra notes 20-24.
U.S. PRIVACY LAWAND THE INTERNET
commerce transactions, are considered reasonably secluded4' The
commentary to Restatement Section 652B suggests that protected
seclusion covers "private concerns" such as an individual's "private
and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his
private bank account."' It seems unlikely that the Internet venue for
such matters as personal mail or personal bank account records would
render such information any less secluded. The illustration to the
Restatement section 652B that focuses on repeated annoying
promotional telephone calls to a person's home despite repeated
requests to desist seems to suggest that personally targeted "push"
technology might constitute an unreasonable intrusion on seclusion "
Even if the Internet were considered a public place, the intrusion
privacy tort5' may still apply in cases of intrusion into "a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. 52
The comment to this part of the Restatement notes that: "Even in a
public place.., there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as
his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze;
and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion
upon these matters."53 There are often issues regarding consent in
intrusion cases-4 But the privacy tort that vindicates seclusion
generally requires that the determination of the individual be
respected with regard to matters that the particular individual
considers personal."
Irene's status as an Internet user does not affect her general
privacy right to prevent having her name or likeness appropriated for
the use or benefit of someone else.56 Most of the decisional law
regarding tort liability for invasion of privacy by appropriation
involves commercial use, such as advertising. When commercial use
48. See, e.g., Mary J. Culnan, GEORGETOWN INTERNET PRIVACY POLICY STUDY: REPORT
TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Mary J. Culnan, study director, 1999); Janlori Goldman
et al., PRIVACY: REPORT ON THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF HEALTH WEB SITES
(Feb. 2000) <http:lleheaIth.chcf.orglpriv~pol3rmdexshow.cfm?doc.id=333>. As noted, supra
notes 21-22, privacy policies, vows and assurances by Internet companies reinforce expectations
of seclusion. Images of locks visually enhance such an expectation of privacy.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
50. Id. at illus. 5.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977)..
52. Id. at cmt. c.
53. Id.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F cmL. b. (1977).
55. Cf. Massachusetts v. Source One Assoc., Inc., No. CIV.A.98-0507-H, 1999 WL
975120 (Mass. Super. Oct 12, 1999) (unauthorized acquisition of personal financial
information).
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
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of a person's name or likeness takes place on-line, the liability
analysis developed in cases involving other commercial media would
apply. For example, using Irene's picture on BrowserCo's web site as
the image of a "happy BrowserCo user" without her consent would
probably be actionable. In addition, as commentary to the
Restatement suggests, there may be liability for appropriation of
Irene's personality even in the absence of commercial use "and even
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.
57
According to the Restatement, passing oneself off as someone else or
"otherwise seek[ing] to obtain for [one]self the values or benefits of
the plaintiff's name or identity," is actionable." If another person uses
Irene's identity to gain benefits, such as credit from an Internet
retailer, or to gain access to valuable Internet services to which Irene
is a subscriber, that person may be liable for invading Irene's privacy
for appropriating her name or likeness.
There are a number of unanswered questions regarding
application of the appropriation privacy tort in the Internet context.
For example, whether Irene's "personal image" in the form of her on-
line profile of browsing habits and purchasing patterns constitutes a
likeness of her for the purposes of the appropriation privacy tort
remains an open question.59 The privacy rights of an Internet user,
such as Irene, to consent or not to consent to transfers of her on-line
profile by Internet retailers or marketing firms is central to the debate
over opt-in, as opposed to opt-out, consumer control over information
reflecting a person's Internet use. Whether Internet users in the
United States must be asked to consent to each appropriation of
information about their on-line activities (opt-in) or, rather, whether
Internet users have implicitly consented to general use of digitized
profiles of their Internet activities so that each Internet user must
expressly withdraw consent to sale of such information (opt-out),
remains a very contentious privacy issue.6° In privacy tort cases,
57. Id. at cmt. b.
58. Id. at cmt. c. Whether it would be actionable under the common law appropriation
privacy tort to use a famous, or infamous, screen name or Internet persona to advertise an
Internet security service is an intriguing matter which has yet to be litigated. Logically if the
name refers to an individual person, the common law tort should apply. Alternative grounds for
liability in such cases might be based on copyright or trademark, if the persona or screen name
were copyrighted or trademarked.
59. See Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In this case the
United States Supreme Court upheld privacy tort liability for appropriation despite First
Amendment protection of freedom of expression, when a television station broadcasted the
performer's entire act as a human cannon ball. Id. at 575.
60. For example, Financial Services Legislation of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113
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consent is often construed narrowly so that a deliberate decision to
opt-in would ordinarily be required.
Both private facts and false light privacy torts require publicity
in the form of widespread dissemination that goes beyond mere
"disclosure" or "publication" as these terms are understood in the law
of defamation. With regard to publicity over the Internet, the
Michaels case, supra, is an example of an actionable invasion of
privacy for publicity regarding private facts over the Internet. Posting
Irene's tax returns on an Internet bulletin board or surreptitiously
webcasting digital pictures of Irene privately celebrating a family
birthday would probably also constitute tortious public disclosure of
private facts, if done without her consent. If digital pictures of Irene's
family celebration were accompanied by misleading references, such
as to "the secret problem of inebriation at home," common law tort
liability for false light invasion of privacy might arise. Even certain
kinds of Internet spoofing by posting slanted information regarding an
individual, for example by describing Irene, who is a gregarious
person with a happy family and many friends, as a "lonely woman
seeking affection on-line," might give rise to false light privacy tort
liability.6
Privacy statutes are even more numerous and varied than the
common law privacy tort actions. Some state privacy statutes enact
particular versions of the privacy torts. For example, in some states
statutory rights of publicity authorize causes of action against
exploitation of celebrity personalities.62 These statutory publicity
rights are similar to privacy rights vindicated by the appropriation
tort, but often provide more extensive privacy protection." Other
statutes have enacted new forms of privacy rights against invasions of
privacy, such as cyberstalking, that were arguably not actionable
Stat. 1338, 1437 (Nov. 12, 1999) adopted an opt-out approach with regard to transfer of
information within a financial institution, but an opt-in approach with regard to disclosures
outside of that financial institution. Given the conglomerate nature of many financial
institutions, which may now include insurance, investments, credit reporting and other services
under the 1999 Financial Services Legislation, the opt-out provisions applicable to transfers
within a financial institution, may result in a much wider presumption of consent to transfer than
is realistic.
61. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
62. See CAL. CrV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). According to the Ninth Circuit, these
statutory rights are in addition to the common law tort privacy rights. See Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. See CAL CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2000) which provides for survival of the
statutory publicity rights of deceased persons.
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under the common law.64 Another example is California Civil Code
section 1708.8(b), regarding constructive invasion of privacy, which
penalizes use of visual or auditory devices to capture images of
personal or familial activities.65 Many privacy statutes focus on
particular types of information, such as consumer credit records
protected under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,66 or Drivers License
Records,67 or on particular databases, such as federal agencies'
systems of records containing personal information, protected under
the Federal Privacy Act.6 These privacy statutes are not specifically
directed at Internet activities, but rather would apply to the Internet
when the specified personal information or privacy invading conduct
occurs on the Internet.
A few statutes target Internet invasions of privacy. For example,
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act6 is directed at
protecting the privacy rights of children who access the Internet. This
statute would protect the privacy of Irene's eight and ten-year old
children, James and Jennifer, who are each on-line about an hour a
day. Another example of a type of state statute directed at Internet
invasions of privacy is the cyberstalking statute such as California's
amendments to its anti-stalking statute noted above.70 If Irene were
on-line in California, for example, the cyberstalking statute would
make it illegal for someone to follow her about by shadowing her
activities on the web and sending her threatening e-mail messages.
In addition to privacy statutes, privacy laws also include agency
64. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West 2000) (establishing liability for stalking,
including threats communicated by means of electronic communication devices).
65. Id. § 1708.8(b). This statute states:
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant
attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type
of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff
engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or
auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if
this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been
achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was
used.
Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994); see also In re TransUnion Corp., No. 9255 (FrC
Mar. 29, 2000) < http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/transunionrestay.htm>.
67. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994); see also Reno
v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (upholding the Act's validity).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
69. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6506 (West 1999).
70. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West 2000).
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regulations that provide privacy protection.7' For example, each
federal agency subject to the Federal Privacy Act is required to
publish regulations with regard to the nature of that agency's systems
of records containing personal information about individuals.7 These
Privacy Act regulations provide Irene both a way to discover which
federal agencies maintain databases containing personal information
about her and a process for accessing that information.7 3  Other
examples of regulatory privacy law affecting the Internet are the
Federal Trade Commission's proposed regulations implementing the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Ace 4 and the Department of
Health and Human Services proposed regulations regarding medical
records. 5
In addition to constitutional, common law, statutory and
regulatory privacy laws, non-governmental self-regulatory measures
can also be the bases for legal privacy rights for Internet users such as
Irene. Theses self-regulatory measures commonly take the form of a
company's own privacy principles. Sometimes companies adopt
codes of fair information practices put forward by trade associations.
For example, Irene might encounter Amazon.com's privacy
767principles76 or those of American Express" when she buys books or
airline tickets over the Internet. These on-line privacy measures may
be given legal effect to the extent that non-compliance would
constitute a deceptive trade practice. For example, Internet retailers
often make privacy promises to induce customers, such as Irene, to
engage in electronic commerce with these companies. If an Internet
retailer promises not to disclose Irene's Internet purchasing records to
any other company, and then turns around and sells Irene's
purchasing history to a direct marketing firm, the Internet retailer may
be liable under deceptive trade practices laws. The Federal Trade
Commission has taken unfair trade practices actions against
companies that have announced privacy principles to attract
71. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 99.1-.67 (2000) (Department of Education regulations
implementing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(1994)).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4), (f) (1994).
73. Id. at (d).
74. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59888 (1999) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312) (proposed Apr. 27, 1999).
75. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59918 (1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64) (proposed Nov. 3, 1999).
76. See Amazon.com: Your Privacy (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http:llwww.amazon.comlexec/obidos/substlmisclpolicy/privacy.htmll>.
77. See American Express Customer Internet Privacy Statement, supra note 21.
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customers, but then failed to abide by their avowed privacy protection
promises. Such enforcement under deceptive trade practices laws
means that if Internet companies falsely represent to Irene that they
will protect her privacy, they may face potential legal liability for
interfering with the privacy protection promised in gaining her
business.
4. Context-dependent
Particular on-the-web applications of privacy laws frequently
depend on the contexts of alleged invasions of privacy. This context-
dependency is at least partly explained by the way privacy law has
evolved over the past century or so, often in reaction to particular
invasions of privacy. For example, when Brandeis first argued that
the common law should recognize a damage action for invasion of
privacy, he pointed to the notorious case of Marion Manola, an
actress photographed in tights against her will.79 More recently, the
use of motor vehicle license records by murderers of young women
has led to the enactment of statutes restricting the availability of such
records.80 Although a few privacy laws apply broadly to a general
form of invasion of privacy, such as electronic surveillance," privacy
laws typically focus on a particular situation or type of personal
information. For example, the federal Video Privacy Protection Act
provides for the privacy protection of video rental records." This
statute was enacted into federal law after the records of Judge Robert
Bork's videotape rentals surfaced in Senate hearings regarding his
nomination to the United States Supreme Court.3 Because privacy
law has characteristically evolved by solving a particular type of
78. See hz re Geocities, Inc., No. C-3849, 1999 FTC LEXIS 17 (FTC Feb. 5, 1999)
(ordering Geocities to cease deceptive trade practices in the form of misrepresentations
regarding the use and collection of personal information).
79. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. The lawsuit, Manola v. Stevens &
Meyers, is discussed in Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
401,402-19 (1990).
80. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994), was prompted
by the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the hit television series, "My Sister
Sam." See 139 CONG. REC. S15745-01, *515762 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); see also
Ellen Barry, Killer's Dreams Bared on the Internet N.H. Man Took to Web to Boast and To
Stalk, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1999, at B1; Killer Plotted Murder Through Internet, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 30, 1999, at A12.
81. See discussion supra notes 26-27.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
83. See S. REP. No. 100-599, at 5-6 (1988); see also House OKs Video Privacy Protection
Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1988, at 12; ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTTCE: How THE BORK
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 274 (1989).
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privacy problem or by reacting to a notorious invasion of privacy, or
by protecting a particular type of personal information, it is not
surprising that context plays an important role in the diversity of
privacy law.
For the most part, the privacy laws applicable to Irene's on-line
activities were not designed for the Internet context, but rather can be
applied to her Internet activities by extrapolation from other settings.
In considering extrapolation of privacy laws to the Internet, two
contextual factors are particularly noteworthy. First, different privacy
laws will apply depending on whether the invasion of privacy
involves collection of personal information or manipulation of
personal information or dissemination of personal information.
Second, different privacy laws will apply depending on whether
privacy is invaded by the government or by the private sector.
Some privacy laws concentrate on controlling collection of
personal information. For example, the constitution and federal
statutes restrict unauthorized electronic surveillance of Irene's on-line
activities without a warrant or intercept order.Y The intrusion privacy
tort also provides a basis for imposing liability for improper collection
of such personal information. And yet the collection of information
about Irene's Internet browsing remains controversial. Marketing
companies maintain that placing cookies in Irene's browser or
identification numbers in her microprocessor has nothing to do with
Irene's privacy, because the information collected does not personally
identify Irene. Rather, the information collected only identifies
hardware or software, not any identified person who may be
manipulating the hardware or software. The potential that records of
Internet activities can be combined with other information to identify
Irene as the user of the identified microprocessor or software cookie
has, however, raised serious privacy concerns. Whether such
information is personal to Irene at the time it is collected, or only
potentially personally identifiable after it is connected to other
information, is among the privacy questions posed by the nearly
infinitely replicable, manipulable and aggregateable qualities of
84. See discussion supra notes 25-26; see also supra notes 82-83.
85. For example, plans by DoubleClick to integrate its web-browsing records with the
consumer database of Abacus, a direct marketing company acquired by DoubleCliek raised a
storm of protest, first from privacy advocates and later from Wall Street. See Jeri Clausing,
Privacy Adovcates Fault New DoubleClick Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at C2; Privacy
on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,2000, at A26; Bob Tedeschi, In a Shift, DoubleClick Puts
Off Its Plan for Wider Use of the Personal Data of Internet Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2000, at C5.
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digitized information. What is certain is that the Internet's global
network magnifies the consequences for individual privacy when a
vast range of such digitized information is collected about people and
their on-line activities.
With regard to aggregation of personal information, the 1999
Financial Services Legislation permits considerable manipulation and
aggregation of personal information within a financial institution.
As financial institutions become global providers of insurance, stock-
trading, savings accounts and direct marketing, in addition to retail
banking, there will be enhanced opportunities for widespread sharing
and manipulation of personal data among the many subsidiaries and
affiliates of modem financial institutions. It is interesting to contrast
this permissive approach in the financial services legislation, allowing
widespread sharing of personal information about customers within a
financial institution, with the approach in the Privacy Act, which
restricts the transfer of an individual's personal information among
federal agencies.8 7
When dissemination of personal information is the context of
privacy concerns, different privacy laws apply. Examples include the
privacy torts of appropriation, private facts and false light as well as
the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Different approaches to legal
protection against improper dissemination of personal information are
characteristic of these privacy laws. For example, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act prohibits dissemination of Irene's credit history
without her consent for all but a few restricted purposes." The
disclosure of private facts privacy tort, on the other hand, provides a
basis for Irene to bring suit for damages against an Internet company
from which she purchased exotic lingerie, if that company were to
publicly post the details of her purchases on its web site.s
Another contextual factor that causes different privacy laws to
apply is whether interference with privacy has been perpetrated by the
government or by the private sector. It is interesting to note that
Brandeis's initial discussion of privacy law was focused on non-
governmental interferences with privacy, mostly by newspapers., °Later, Brandeis came to see government as posing an even greater
86. See Financial Services Legislation of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat.
1338, 1437 (Nov. 12, 1999).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
88. 15U.S.c. § 1681b-1681c(1994).
89. See discussion supra notes 38, 45. Common law tort liability is also possible under
appropriation and false light privacy theories for Internet postings of personal information.
90. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 8-17. £
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danger to individual privacy:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping .... Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; .... To declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.9'
Justice William 0. Douglas agreed with Brandeis that the
government's threat to privacy was much more serious than that
posed by the private sector.92
Although concerns about government interference with privacy
remain important, 3 at the turn of the twenty-first century, the focus of
privacy concerns seems to have turned increasingly toward worries
about invasion of privacy by private-sector hackers and crackers and
telemarketers. Thomas Friedman calls this the "little brother"
problem,9' as distinguished from the problem of omnipresent
government surveillance symbolized by 'Big Brother" in George
Orwell's novel, 1984."5 Internet users seem to be particularly
concerned about private-sector collectors, manipulators and sellers of
personal information in what is now a globalized marketplace.
Privacy law has always been responsive when new threats to privacy
are identified. The focus of primary concerns about government
invasions of privacy, such as those associated with Watergate, seem
to shifting toward enhanced concern about invasions of privacy by the
private sector, such as those associated with disclosures of credit card
numbers from Internet sites. Underlying concerns about protecting
individual privacy from being overwhelmed by society, whether in
the form of big government or in the form of big business, remains a
strong force in American law.
91. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Eventually the United States Supreme Court agreed with Brandeis and reversed Olmstead. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 123-24 (1958); see also
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Dorothy J. Glancy,
Getting Government Offthe Backs of People, 21 SANTA CLARAL. REV. 1047, 1050-51 (1981).
93. See The Searchable Soul, HARPER'S MAG., Jan. 1,2000, at 57.
94. See Thomas L. Friedman, Little Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, Sec. 4 at 17;
Thomas L. Friedman, The Hackers' Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,2000, at A31.
95. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
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B. Decentralized
The decentralized nature of United States privacy law further
complicates understanding the intersections of privacy law with the
Internet. There are not only diverse types of privacy laws operating
in many different contexts, but also many different sources of these
laws. Federal law and state law provide the two primary sources of
privacy law in the United States. In addition, as noted earlier,
sometimes these state and federal privacy laws interact with private-
sector representations regarding privacy policies and industry privacy
standards. As a result, if Internet users such as Irene were suddenly to
see the operation of the privacy laws potentially applicable to their
Internet activities, they would see these privacy laws coming from
several directions at once.
The decentralized pattern of United States privacy law is in
marked contrast to the more centralized approach taken in Europe,
associated with the 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive.96
The overall purpose of the European Data Protection Directive is to
harmonize within the European Union the law which applies to
processing personal information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person 7 Under the Data Protection Directive,
every member state in the European Union is required to adopt strict
privacy laws providing privacy rights at minimum levels described in
the directive. Such a centralized "harmonization" contrasts with the
deliberately decentralized "cacophony" of United States privacy law."
Federalism is the primary reason why United States privacy law
has generally avoided the centralized one-size-fits-all approach
exemplified by the European Data Protection Directive. Indeed,
reflecting federalism, United States privacy law mixes both federal
and state laws, and also accommodates a divergent pattern of state
privacy laws that often vary considerably from state to state. In
another context, Justice Brandeis insisted that it is important for states
96. See DIRECrIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 24
OCTOBER 1995 ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF
PERSONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA (October 24, 1995)
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/Iif/dat/1995/en-395L0046.html>. Effective October 25, 1998,
the Directive is subject to continuing refinement.
97. See id. at arts. 2-3.
98. The European Data Protection Directive can have practical consequences with regard
to Internet activities involving personal information if these activities take place in part in
Europe. Difficult and still unresolved, issues with regard to jurisdiction over Internet activities
to make it hard to predict which nation's privacy law will apply in any given circumstance
involving transnational flows of personally identifiable data.
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to be able to experiment with social and economic legislation. He
noted that "it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.'
Although Brandeis was not discussing privacy law in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, one of the most interesting social and economic
areas in which extensive experimentation has taken place across the
states, as well as between the states and the federal government, is
with regard to privacy laws.
A good example of the decentralized pattern of federal and state
privacy law is the complex layering of federal and state privacy laws
regarding electronic surveillance discussed earlier in this essay."0
Initially based primarily on federal constitutional and statutory law,
these electronic surveillance laws now include the variety of both
state and federal privacy laws that are applicable to electronic
surveillance of Internet communications. Consider how both federal
and state laws protect the privacy of Irene's Internet communications.
Recall that Gill is a federal law enforcement official who has tapped
Irene's modem line to intercept her Internet communications without
a warrant or intercept order and that Gill's invasion of Irene's privacy
is illegal under federal law.01 Recall also that interception of Irene's
Internet communications by a private investigator, Paul, would violate
different provisions of federal wiretap statutes, as well as provisions
of state law in most states.'02 However, in some states, such non-
governmental recording of Irene's Internet communications through
use of an extension telephone on Irene's modem line would be illegal;
but in many other states such interception would not be considered an
invasion of privacy. For example, if Irene were on-line in California,
use of the extension line would violate California's highly restrictive
electronic surveillance laws.'0 3  But if Irene were on-line in New
99. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
101. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2701-2711 (1994); Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1994); McVeigh
v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). If Gill were a state law enforcement official, he
might also be in violation of state constitutional provisions and statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1999).
102. See, e.g., Biton v. Menda, 796 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1992). The Federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994), does not preempt state statutes
which provide more protection to the privacy of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. §
2516(2) (1994).
103. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; CAL PENAL CODE § 630-37.2 (West 1999); Ribas v.
Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985).
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Hampshire, that state's more permissive electronic eavesdropping
laws would permit use of the extension telephone line to record
Irene's Internet transmissions. °4
Although, privacy protection in the United States typically
comes from a mixture of federal and state privacy laws, an
interesting, and rare, exception to the decentralized pattern of federal
and state privacy laws is the law that applies to the privacy of
consumer credit records under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting
Act.'0 5 With certain limited exceptions, only federal law applies with
regard to matters covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act."' Aside
from the Fair Credit Reporting Act, state privacy laws are generally
not preempted by federal law. For example, the 1999 Financial
Services Legislation expressly allows states to adopt more stringent
privacy protections.' 7 So far, Internet users have not expressed
interest in a unified federal privacy law that would preempt state
experimentation with divergent approaches to privacy protection.
Rather, Brandeis's notion of benign variation among state privacy
laws, as well as between federal privacy laws and state privacy law
seems likely to continue to be the preferred pattern of privacy laws in
the United States.
C. Dynamic
Compounding the diversity and decentralization of United States
privacy laws, is the remarkable dynamism of privacy law in the
United States. From its inception in the nineteenth century, privacy
law has evolved in response to new challenges to the privacy interests
of individuals, particularly challenges posed by new technologies.
This dynamic quality of privacy law is evident as old privacy laws
confront new challenges posed by the Internet. Indeed, part of the
original argument for recognition of the right to privacy in the United
States was based on the need to respond to societal and technological
change:
Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights... Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of
the person and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley
104. See State v. Telles, 139 N.H. 344,653 A.2d 554 (1995).
105. 15U.S.C.§ 1681-1681t(1994).
106. Id.
107. See Financial Services Legislation of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 507(b), 113 Stat.
1338, 1442 (Nov.12, 1999).
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calls the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.'lo
Among the privacy threatening technologies that worried Warren
and Brandeis 1890 were the flash camera, plate glass, the telephone
and telegraph.'O' Later, in his famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead,
Brandeis expressed concern that "Discovery and invention have made
it possible for the government by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet."" He speculated that
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may
some day be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions."'
Had Brandeis imagined the Internet, he most likely would have
predicted, and urged, further development of privacy law.
Contemporary society's voyeuristic interest in prying into the
details of personal life, evident in such aspects of popular culture as
talk radio and shock broadcasting, pose a counter force against
development of laws more protective of privacy."' Internet
webcasting of activities including sexual intercourse, childbirth,
working on homework and all sorts of other ordinary life activities,
from the trivial to the profane, brings private life onto the web-on
web cam, on-line, available virtually all of the time. Such challenges
to privacy are not new. Even in 1890, Warren and Brandeis
expressed outrage over the destructive impact of widespread
108. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193, 195.
109. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 8.
110. Olmstead v. United States (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 277 U.S. 438,473 (1928).
111. Id. at 474.
112. Typical examples are television's "The Jerry Springer Show," the film, "The Truman
Show" and "Big Brother," which broadcasts the real lives of individuals over television in
Holland and Germany.
113. Judge Richard Posner has described this voyeurism as the interest in prying, which
weighs against the interest in privacy. See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L.
REv. 393,394-97 (1978).
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publication of the details of private life: "To satisfy a prurient taste
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers."' 4  The Internet's proven capacity for even wider
circulation of ever more personal and private information would
undoubtedly have greatly troubled Warren and Brandeis, who counted
the devaluation of private life through widespread disclosure as
among the important policy reasons for legally protecting the right to
privacy.
As the Internet itself rapidly evolves, new privacy challenges are
certain. For example, a recent research report predicts that there will
be more than 1.4 billion Internet participants world-wide by 2004." s
What is perhaps even more remarkable is that the report predicts that
by 2004 a majority of Internet participants will access the Internet
over mobile terminals-both handheld and in vehicles. An estimated
670 million people will access the web through fixed or "wired"
platforms. But 750 million people will access the web over wireless
modems, PDAs such as Palm Pilots and Psions, and Internet access
built into vehicles."' The suggestion is that the World Wide Web
may well be rapidly transforming into a Wireless World Wide Web.
As this transformation in Internet usage takes place, new privacy law
issues will undoubtedly arise. These new privacy law issues not only
include intensified privacy concerns with regard to the security of
wireless Internet communications. They also will reflect privacy
concerns about an individual's control over information that pinpoints
an individual's geographical location as she accesses various sites on
the Internet from changing locations.
m. CONCLUSION
Despite Scott McNealy's pessimistic views, privacy is unlikely
to wither away in the United States. If the past is any guide to the
future of privacy law, the American public is unlikely to "get over"
114. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196. The article decried the publication and
circulation of personal information as "potent for evil" and explained:
It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of
things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal
gossip attains the dignity of print and crowds the space available for matters of
real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless
mistake its relative importance.
Id.
115. See THE ARC GROUP, WIRELESS INTERNEr: APPLICATIONS, TECHNOLOGY & PLAYER
STRATEGIES (1999). The contents of the report are also available at <http:llwww.the-arc-
group.com/reports/wireless intemet/toc_wi/htm>.
116. See id.
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privacy anytime soon. The privacy laws discussed in this essay
already affect the Internet in remarkable ways. The future is likely to
bring to bear even more privacy laws. These privacy laws may well
remain invisible to most people. But there will be privacy laws
intersecting with the Internet in more ways that even sophisticated
Internet users may imagine. The wide spectrum of participants in the
February 2000 symposium on Privacy in the Next Millennium
sponsored by the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law
Journal presented a clear demonstration that the interaction between
privacy law and the Internet remains a matter of significant concern to
those who think, write legislate and regulate about privacy in the
twenty-first century.

